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1973 — A Year of Inflation
by NORMAN N. BOWSHFR
itt MAJOR setback in the s~iggleagainst inflation
was suffered during 1973. Average prices, as meas-
ured by the GNP price deflator, rose at a 6.8 percent
annual rate over the first three quarters of the year.
From 1965 to 1972 prices rose at an average 4 per-
cent rate. Fiscal developments became less expansive
in 1973, interest rates rose markedly, and the growth
rate of the monetary base slowed slightly. Neverthe-
less, price stability remains an elusive goal in view of
the strongly imbedded expectations of continning
inflation.
At the beginning of 1973, many observers felt that
the pace of inflation might accelerate from the 3.2
percent annual rate experienced from early 1971 to
late 1972, but few, if any, were able to forecast the
severity of the 1973 inflation. The President’s Council
of Economic Advisers was quite optimistic, actually
anticipating a moderate decline in the rate of price
increases in the course of 1973.’ More typical of price
expectations as the year began was the sentiment ex-
pressed in the last sentence of an article which ap-
peared in this Review last December: “. ..as 1973
begins, it appears to most forecasters that inflationary
pressures may mount during the year.”2
The explosion in prices that actually occurred dur-
ing 1973 was startling, even to those anticipating an
acceleration in price markups. In fact, many of the
‘Economic Report of the President, January 1973, page 82.
2
No,man N. Bowsher, “1972 — A Year of Rapid Economic
Expansion,” this Review (December 1972), p. 10.
strong influences on prices during the year could have
been only partially anticipated as the year began.
Examples include: the price effects of reduced output
of some feed and food crops abroad; the devaluation
of the dollar in February and the subsequent addi-
tional slide in the dollar’s value in international mar-
kets; the inflations in Europe and Japan; price con-
trols which made it expedient to reduce livestock
production and shut down food processing plants
while demand for food was rising; and the energy
crisis.
A listing of such special influences on individual
prices gives an exaggerated impression of the effect of
these irregular developments on the trend of average
prices. Without denying the substantial impact of un-
usual demand and supply factors on individual prices,
it appears that the previous trend of economic activity
and stabilization actions taken earlier have nonethe-
less been the major influences on price developments
in 1973. In this review of 1973, discussion is first de-
voted to these earlier developments. Then, after ex-
amining economic developments of 1973, an outlook
for 1974 is presented.
Framework of Analysis
The approach used in this
prominent view which holds
growth rate of money have
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extended periods, say four years or longer, has a
dominant effect on the trend of prices, Marked
changes in the growth rate of money around this
trend, lasting about three quarters or more, have
effects on production aild employment; but once a
trend growth of money is fully reflected in prices, the
production and employment effects vanish.
This monetary approach does not neglect the role
of Federal budget developments, however. Changes
in Government spending, in particular, have transitory
effects on total spending in the economy for several
quarters. These effects tend to be positive initially,
and then are reversed as a crowding~outeffect of the
financing of Government expenditures results in
duction in private outlays.3 In addition, Government
taxing and spending actions can alter the allocation
of income, affect long-term economic growth rates,
and influence monetary growth rates.
Background
The last economic recession in this country ex-
tended from late 1969 to late 1970. From the third
quarter of 1969 to the end of 1970, real output d&
dined moderately and the unemployment rate rose.
However, the recession was mild, especially when ad-
justed for the adverse effects of a large auto strike
late in 1970. Total spending on goods and services
continued to rise throughout this period at a 4 percent
annual rate, or at approximately the same pace as the
long-run expansion of productive capacity. The ac-
celeration of inflation was halted, and progress was
made toward price stability. During 1971, forces gen-
erating recovery appeared to be dominant. Neverthe-
less, it was felt by policymakers that the economy
should be strongly stimulated in an effort to obtain
more production and a higher level of employment
within a relatively brief period.
During and following the 1970 recession, fiscal ac-
tions were more expansive in an effort to stimulate
economic activity. Taxes were reduced through tax
reform, cuts in excise tax rates, increases in personal
tax exemptions, and restoration of an investment tax
credit. Government expenditures rose at an 11 per-
cent annual rate from early 1970 to late 1972. The
high-employment budget of the Government (which
attempts to abstract from the influence of actual eco-
nomic activity on the realized surplus or deficit)
moved from a $12 billion surplus in calendar year
1969 to a $3 billion deficit in 1972.
~Roger W. Spencer and William P. Yohe, “The ‘Crowding Out’
of Private Expenditmes by Fiscal Policy Actions”, this
Review (October 1970).
Monetary developments also became much more
stimulative in the 1970-72 period. Growth in the
money stock, which had averaged 3 percent from
early 1969 to early 1970, accelerated to an average 7
percent rate from early 1970 to the end of 1972. By
comparison, the trend growth of money from 1957 to
1985, when prices were relatively stable, was at an
average 2.5 percent rate, and in the inflationary pe-
riod of 1965 to 1968 money rose at an average 5.2
percent pace.
Reflecting the more expansive monetary and fiscal
actions, total spending on goods and services accel-
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which rose at a 4.2 percent annual rate from the fall
of 1969 to the end of 1970, climbed 93 percent in
1971 and 10.6 percent in 1972. During this period the
rate of inflation conthmed to slow as a result of the
delayed effects of the monetary and fiscal discipline
in 1969, in addition to the initial impact of the con-
trols on wages and prices which began with the
freeze in August 1971. Prices, as measured by the
GNP deflator, slowed to a 3.2 percent pace from early
1971 to late 1972 from a6percent pace in late
1969-early 1970.
With spending rising rapidly and the rate of infia-
boll moderating, production, employment, and real
income expanded markedly. From the last quarter of
1970 to the last quarter of 1972, total real output, for
example, rose at a rapid 6.3 percent annwtl rate, after
having declined slighfly, on balance, in the previous
five quarters.
Resource utilization became more intense with
production rising at a much faster pace than capacity.
Aithotigh some plants and workers remained unem-
ployed, producers began finding it more difficult to
obtain the resources desired for further rapid expan-
sion. In the final months of 1972, indications of a re-
newal of expansionary forces were becoming evident.
Despite Phase H wage and price coiltrols, consumer
prices rose at a 4.2 percent annual rate from June
1972 to January 1973, up from a 3 percent rate of in-
crease in the first half of 1972.
Economic Activity in 1973
As the year began, the upward momentum of
spending, production, and employment was strong.
Stabilization actions of the Government, which usually
operate with some lag, had been urnismilly expansive
throughout 1972. The volume of unused resources was
not large and was being reduced steadily. In short,
strong demands for goods and services were begin-
ning to press against limited supplies, a situation con~
ducive to an inflationary surge.
Economic activity continued to expand at a very
brisk pace during much of 1973. Total spending rose
at an even faster pace in the first three quarters than
it did in 1971 or 1972. Production and employment,
although strongly stimulated by a vigorous demand,
increased at less rapid rates as the year progressed
reflecting, in part, capacity constraints. Prices, as a
result, rose sharply, and for some items, where the
upward trend of prices was delayed by Government
controls, shortages developed.
DECEMBER 1973
Spcndi~g — Total spending on goods and services
expanded at an 11.9 percent compounded annual rate
in the first three quarters of 1973. In 1972, total
spending rose 10.6 percent, and in 1971 it increased
9.3 percent. By comparison, the trend growth of
spending (1957 to 1971) before the recent surge was
at a 6.4 percent pace.
Market forces allocated the marked gains in aggre-
gate spending across nearly every sector of the eco-
nomy. The distribution of spending was also influ-
enced to a degree by nonmarket constraints such as
interest rate ceilings, other price controls, and
subsidies.
Consumers increased their outlays substantktlly dur-
ing 1973, For a brief period during the summer the
hectic pace of baying meat and home freezers verged
on a scare-buying panic. Expenditures on automobiles
and other durable goods rose at an 11 percent rate in
the first three quarters of 1973, and spending on
nondurable goods aild services expanded at a 12 per~
cent pace. Business investment increased at a 9 per-
cent rate, and Government purchases of goods and
services rose at a 10 percent annual rate. The nation
had net exports of goods and services to foreigners in
the first three quarters of 1973, following net imports
in the previous year. This change in our net foreign
position reflected both a more realistic pricing of the
dollar in foreign exchange markets and a sharp in~
crease in worldwide demand for U.S. farm and food
products.
Some slowing in the rate of spending growth de-
veloped in the late summer and fall of this year. In
the first seven months of 1973, for example, total retail
sales rose at a 15 percdilt annual rate, From July to
October, these sales increased at oniy a 5.5 percent
rate.
Credit Growth in spending, as is usually the case,
was accompanied by a rise in credit outstanding. Total
commercial bank credit expanded at a 15 percent
annual rate ill the first ten months of 1973. By corn~
parison, commercial bank credit rose at a trend rate
of 7.9 percent from 1957 to 1972. Mortgage credit
extended by savings and loan associations increased
at a 16 percent rate in the first eight months of 1973,
while loans and securities of mutual savings banks
grew at an 8 percent pace. Business advances, real
estate loans, consumer credit, and Government in-
debtedness (including agencies) all expanded subS
stantiafly. After mid-year, however, growth in real
estate loans slowed as competition for a limited sup-
ply of funds intensified.
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Reflecting the sharply expanded demand for credit
pressing against a limited supply of funds from saving
and from bank credit creation, the cost of credit, par-
ticularly for short-term funds, rose markedly in the
first eight or nine months of 1973. In addition, there
were fewer institutional obstacles distorting norrna~
credit flows than there were in the 1969-1970 episode.
For example, ceiling rates on large CDs were lifted,
the rates that thrift institutions could pay to attract
savings were raised, and some state usury laws were
relaxed. While interest rates may have been bid
Yields on three-month Treasury bills moved up
from about 5 percent in December 1972 to an average
8.67 percent in August 1973. The previous monthly
peak in bill rates was 7.87 percent in January 1970.
The announced rate on bank loans to prime business
customers jumped (in a series of steps) from 6 per-
cent in December 1972 to a level of 10 percent in Tate
September and early October 1973, surpassing the
previous aiLtime high of 8.5 percent in late 1969-
early 1970. Interest rates on mortgages and long4erm
bonds also rose in this period, but since credit de-
mands were largely focused on short-term obligations,
the increase was much less dramatic.
Total new construction, which rose 14 percent in
1972, increased at a 9 percent rate in the first four
months of 1973, and has changed little since April.
~The term “credit cnmch” is used to refer to a period of
financial stress wherein rapidly changing supply and demand
forces, i’~combination with nonmarket interest rate regula-




higher than they would have otherwise, the severe
wrenching of a “credit crunch” was avoided.4
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Production — Ill contrast to the acceleration in the
rise in spending, the rate of production growth slowed
during the first ten months of 1973. Industrial pro-
duction, which rose 12 percent in 1972, increased at
an 8 percent annual rate in the first seven months of
1973 and at a 3.5 percent rate since July. A major
factor in the slowdown was economic capacity limita-
tions, which were adversely affected by a diminished
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The trend since April reflects moderate declines in
residential and Government mitlays largely offset by
expansion in commercial and “other” constniction.
The growth rate in the real output of all goods and
services (GNP in constant prices) also moderated
during the year. After expanding 7 percent during
1972, it rose at a 5.5 percent annual rate in the first
half of 1973 and at a 3.4 percent rate in the third
quarter. However, the average 4.8 percent rate of
growth during 1973 has been greater than the esti-
mated long-run growth in productive capacity and
hence more rapid than can be sustained over an ex-
tended period, given ciirrent growth rates in labor,
capital, and technology.
Employment Job opportunities were plentiful
during the year. Total civilian employment expanded
at a rapid 4.2 percent annual rate in the first ten
months of 1973. This compares with the 1.6 percent
trend growth in employment from 1957 to 1972. Even
with the rapid rise in employment, some firms re-
ported having difficulties obtaining employees at cur-
rent wage rates, and as a result production growth was
hampered at a time when demand for goods and
services was expanding rapidly.
The unemployment rate among all civilian workers,
which averaged 5.9 percent in 1971 and 5.6 percent
in 1972, fell to an average of 4.9 percent in the first
ten months of 1973. Among heads of households, 1111-
employment was 3.7 percent in 1971, 3.3 percent in
1972, and 2.9 in the first ten months of 1973, Of those
~inemp1oyed in 1973, over half had been seeking
employment for less than a month.
As is frequently the case in periods of economic
ebullience, efficiency of labor improved oniy slightly
in 1973. In the first three quarters of the year, output
per man-hour increased at a 1.5 percent annual rate.
By sharp contrast, in 1971 the gain was 4.7 percent,
and in 1972 it was 5 percent.
The reduced growth in labor output per hour was
an important factor in the 6.7 percent increase in
unit labor costs in 1973; this was ~ipfrom a 2.3 percent
rate in the two previous years. Another factor con-
tributing to the jump in ~rnit labor costs was that
wages and other compensation rose at an 8.3 percent
rate in the first three quarters of 1973, compared with
increases averaging 7.3 percent in the two preceding
years.
income Together with greater sales, production,
and employment, incomes have been rising at a
lively rapid rate; however, most of the gains have been
eroded by sharp increases in consumer prices. Total
personal income rose at a 10.3 percent annual rate in
the first ten months of 1973. By comparison, such in-
come rose 10.2 percent in 1972 and 7.9 percent in
1971. After adjustment for changes in eons~inier prices,
real personal income grew at a 1.3 percent pace in
1973 as against an average 5.5 percent pace in the
two previous years.
Corporate profits recovered sharply during the year,
but remained iow relative to the mid-1960s when the
inflation was first developing. In the first three quar-
ters of 1973 corporate profits after taxes rose at a 26
percent armual rate, even though they thrned down
slightly in the third quarter. In the third quarter,
profits were 5.5 percent of gross national product
compared with 6.5 percent in the 1964-66 period. On
the other hand, compensatioll of employees was 61
percent of GNP in the third quarter compared with
58 percent in 1964-66.
Prices Most analysts agree that inflation has been
a serious, if not the most serious, economic problem of
the nation.5 The inflation, which began back in the
mid-1960s, was stronger ill 1973 than in any of the
previous years. Average prices, as measured by the
GNP deflator, rose at a 6.8 percent annual rate in the
first three qiiarters of 1973. This surpasses the previous
peak of 6 percent, registered in the late 1969~earIy
1970 period.
Mt its annual meeting in September 1973, the National Asso-
ciation of Business Economists were polled on what they con-
sidered the primary economic problem for the corning year,
at~d63 percent listed inflation. Government controls, the
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The inflation surge in 1973 occurred despite a
Phase III system of price controls, a price freeze in
the summer, and a Phase TV confrols program which,
in general, permitted only a “pass-through” of the
dollar amount of higher costs. The sharp rise in prices
reflected a number of factors. The chief upward force
on prices resulted from a strong demand for goods
and services, which was nurtured by the expansive
monetary and fiscal developments of 1971 and 1972.
Some individual prices responded to cost-push
forces generated by previous excesses. This was par-
ticularly true after both the expiration of Phase II
controls in January and the devaluation of the dollar
in early 1973. Then, too, there were bad weather con-
ditions during the harvest period last year, a vigorous
foreign demand for food, himber, and other commodi-
ties, and an energy shortage at current prices.
Consumer prices rose at an 8.9 percent annual rate
in the first ten mollths of 1973. By comparison, con-
sumer prices rose at a 4.1 percent rate from 1965 to
1972, and at a 1.4 percent rate from 1953 to 1965.
Since the rise this year was greater than the amount
permitted to be paid employees under the controls
programs, most individuals relying on wages and
salaries as their primary source of income found that
they had less real buying power at the end of the
year than at the beginning. Similarly, most people
owning savings accounts and bonds had the privilege
of paying income taxes on interest “earnings” which
didn’t even maintain the purchasing power of the
principal.
Wholesale prices rose even more sharply than con-
sumer prices in 1973. In the first ten months of the
year, wholesale quotations were up at a 17 percent
annual rate, compared with a 3 percent trend rate
from 1965 to 1972, and an 0.8 percent pace from 1953
to 1965. Prices of industrial commodities rose at a 10
percent rate, and those of farm products and proc-
essed foods and feeds jumped at a 33 percent rate, on
balance, in the first ten months of 1973.
Controls held back increases in the prices of some
items for a time as evidenced by a number of short-
ages and interruptions to production as businessmen
found it undesirable to produce at a loss or at the
mandated profit margins. Over time prices have
tended to move toward their equilibrium levels, and
so the net effect of controls in the longer run seems
to be less clear. Any contribution of controls toward
lower prices, however, should be viewed in light of
losses in output, the freedom of choice sacrificed,
reduced incentives, quality deterioration, distorted re-
source allocation, and administrative costs.
Fiscal Developments
Fiscal actions taken before the start of the year had
a major influence on economic activity during 1973.
Actions taken in 1973 probably played a role also,
particularly on economic developments late in the
year.
Taxing and expenditure actions by the Federal
Government in 1971 and 1972 probably had a tern-
Itil, ScdI,
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porary direct expansionary effect oil the economy,
and may have had some indirect effect by influencing
a faster pace of monetary expansion. Early in 1973
fiscal actions had a moderately stimulative impact,
but later in the year actions became less expansionary.
Growth in Federal expenditures has been at a
rapid 9.2 percent average annual rate since early
1970, according to the national income accounts bud-
get. By comparison, from early 1967 to early 1970,
Government expenditures rose at a more moderate 7
percent annual rate, despite large military spending
for Vietnam. National defense outlays have declined
since early 1970, reflecting the withdrawal from Viet-
nam and a changing of naüonal priorities. On the
other hand, social programs and other nondefense
spending have been expanded at a rapid 15.1 percent
average annual rate since early 1970.
Efforts to restrain the Government’s spending
growth had some effect during 1973, but the public’s
desire for more and more Government spending was
difficult to resist. Since the last half of 1972, growth of
total Government spending has been at a 7.8 percent
annual rate, down from a 9.6 percent rate in the two
previous years.
Government tax receipts have risen rapidly in re-
cent years with the expansion in individual and cor-
porate incomes, but the rise has been slowed sorne~
what by reductions in tax rates. Most significant were
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which had some effects
in lowering tax receipts in later years, and the Reve-
nue Act of 1971. In the latter instance, personal tax
exemptions were increased, excise taxes on automo-
biles were eliminated, and a tax credit on investment
was reinstated.
Not only did fiscal developments become more
stimulative from 1970 through 1972, but the timing
of some of the fiscal stimulus may have been shifted
from 1972 to 1973 by an overwithholding of 1972 tax
payments, which were refunded during 1973. This
overwithholding, estimated to amount to about $9
billion, acted to restrain economic activity in 1972 but
to stimulate it during 1973, particularly in the first
half of the year. The overwithholding resulted from a
change in the income-tax withholding tables incor-
porated in the tax law effective January 1, 1972. The
change was designed to correct a previous under-
withholding for certain taxpayers.
The high-employment budget, a widely used sum-
mary measure of fiscal impact, became progressively
more expansive from 1969 through 1972. In calendar
1969, the budget was $11.8 billion in surplus. Re-
flecting larger increases in expenditures than in re~
ceipts, the surplus declined to $8 billion in 1970 and
to $2.2 billion in 1971. In 1972, the budget turned into
deficit by $3.1 billion. In the first quarter of 1973, the
deficit was at an annual rate of $2.8 billion, but in the
second and third quarters surpluses were again re-
corded, estimated at an average $5 billion rate.
Monetary Developments
As stated above, monetary developments became
progressively more expansive, on a year-to-year basis,
from 1969 through 1972. Indications are that in 1973
monetary growth has been only slightly less than in
1972. During 1969 (from fourth quarter 1968 to
hrnrth quarter 1969) the money stock of the nation
demand deposits and currency — increased 4.2 per-
cent. In 1970 money increased 5.7 percent, in 1971
it went up 6,9 percent, and in 1972 it rose 7.4
percent. Published data show that from the fourth
quarter of 1972 until the three months ending No-
vember 1973, money expanded at a 5 percent annual
rate.6 However, data available on nonmember bank
deposits indicate that when the next benchmark re-
vision is made, the data will show that money grew
at a faster rate during the year.
Published data show that money plus net time
deposits in commercial banks, a broader measure that
some analysts find useful, rose at a 7.8 percent annual
rate in the first eleven months of 1973. In 1972, this
aggregate grew 10.6 percent and in 1971 it went up
11.5 percent. As with the data for the narrowly-defined
money stock, forthcoming revisions are likely to raise,
on balance, the 1973 growth rate of this aggregate.
Total loans and investments of commercial banks rose
at a 14.6 percent annual rate in the eleven months of
1973, alter increasing 14.7 percent in 1972 and 11.5
percent in 1971.
The monetary base, the sources of which include
Federal Reserve credit and the monetary gold stock,
among other items, increased at a~average 7,7 per-
cent rate from early 1970 to the end of 1972 and at a
7.1 percent rate in the first eleven months of 1973.
Growth of money fluctuated more than the base in
1973 because other uses of base (that is, time deposits
and Treasury deposits) and the mix of money be-
tween demand deposits and currency, operated to
6
November 1973 fiBures for money and money phs net time
deposits are based on available data for the first 21 days of
that month.
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cause short-run fluctuations in the money stock. Over
longer periods, the rnnltiplier relationship between
the base and money has usually been relatively stable.
Outlook
The upward momentum of spending, production,
and incomes remains strong as 1973 comes to an end.
However, signs of slowing have begun to appear in
recent months. For example, growth in retail sales
has moderated, credit demands have lessened, and
short-term interest rates have moved down from their
peaks. The composite index of twelve leading indica-
tors of business activity, which rose at a 14.4 percent
annual rate in the first half of 1973, increased at a
1.5 percent rate from June to September. Both mone-
tary and fiscal actions have been slightly less expan-
sionary, and the influence of these developments are
usually observed only after some delay.
The “standard” forecast for 1974 is for continued
increases in spending, production, and incomes, but at
reduced rates from those in 1973. Some “cooling” ill
the economy from the pace which was causing in-
tensified inflation is desirable. Barring major cutbacks
resulting from the “energy crisis,” and assuming that
the Federal budget continues to be at near balance
and that money growth is at a moderate rate, the
economic slowdown should not turn into a recession.
A mild economic adjustment, however, means that
progress in reducing the rate of inflation is likely to
be slow. Many people are basing their actions on the
belief that prices will continue to rise, and in addition,
many contracts are based on an expected inflation.
Then, too, because of controls, information costs, iner-
tia, and other forces causing lags in establishing prices,
a number of prices are currently below anticipated
long-run equilibrium levels. As some prices move up,
the natural forces of the market exert upward pres-
sure on other prices. Most forecasts of price behavior
for 1974 are in the 4 to 6 percent range of increase.
Policies designed to bring less inflation within a one-
year span wodd likely be accompanied by a downturn
in output and employment.
Conclusions
The current inflation began in the rnid-1960s in re-
sponse to increased expenditures for the Vietnam war,
a rapid acceleration in the implementation of social
programs, and the methods by which these activities
were financed. The inflation has been costly, and, to
the distress of many, it has been stronger in 1973 than
in any other year since it began.
Given the strongly imbedded inflation, it serves no
purpose to pretend that there is a quick, easy, or
costless cure to the economic disarray. Inflationary
expectations were built up gradually over a number
of years, as time after time those who failed to antici-
pate the inflatioll Ill their economic decisions sustained
losses. These experiences probably will not be qinckly
forgotten.
On two occasions, in 1966-67 and 111 1969-70, vig-
orolls efforts were made to attack the basic causes of
inflation by monetary and fiscal restraint. There were
costs in terms of foregone prod iction and employ-
ment. In each period, the tempo of economic activity
slowed in response to the ii~itiaIwithdrawal of mone-
tary and fiscal stimulus. Substantial progress was made
in combattmg inflation, and after a brief period, the
economy resumed expansioll at the estimated maxi-
mum sustainable rate. However, in both recovery
periods stabilization emphasis shifted to the goal of
obtaining a faster expansion, and the benefits of the
previous periods of policy moderation were lost. After
about two years the rate of inflation in each case be-
came even more intense than it was prior to the
adoption of restrictive policies.
Beginning in August of 1971, another approach to
restraining inflation was attempted. Advocates be-
lieved that by implementing direct controls on prices,
less inflation without the adverse effects of lost pro-
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duction could be attained. The program appeared to
have some initial success under the freeze, but experi-
ence both in this country and in others indicates that
controls are not likely to hold back prices for long.
Controls do not remove the basic economic forces
which cause inflation, but are only an attempt to re-
strain the symptoms.
During 1973~a third effort at resisting the basic
causes of inflation has been initiated. Monetary and
fiscal actions have become somewhat less expansive.
Success in substantially reducing inflation may involve
greater costs now, in terms of lost production, than
would have been required in the 1966-67 and 1969-70
periods, since the current inflation is stronger and
more firmly imbedded. If withdrawal of stimulus is
slow, production should continue to grow, but at a
slower pace for perhaps a year before returning to a
long-run maximum sustainable pace. Under these con-
ditions, inflation should gradually dissipate over a pe-
riod of about four or five years, assuming that policies
are not changed again to achieve a more rapid, but
unsustainable, expansion. Developments in 1974 will
be crucial in determining whether this effort to resist
inflation will be successful.
U.S. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS
DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1973*
The U.S. international economic situation in 1973
was dominated by movement toward surplus in the
trade balance.’ Other major events which transpired
during the year were the following: massive short-
term capital outflows in January and February, dollar
devaluation on February 12, the subsequent floating
of major currencies against the dollar followed by
continued dollar depreciation until early July, and
theu a strengthening in the international pi-ice of the
dollar, Since the physical quantities of both exports
and imports respond only slowly to exchange rate
alterations, the U.S. trade balance was probably only
marginally affected by the 1973 dollar depreciation.
However, the currency price changes may exert a
stronger infiuenc~ on this balance in 1974.
Trade Balance
The devaluation of the dollar in December 1971
apparently started to influence the quantities of ex-
ports and imports in mid-1972 when it became ap-
parent that the rate of increase of U.S. purchases of
imports declined, and the rate of increase of foreign
purchases of U.S. exports increased. This reversal of
*This section was written by Hans H. Heibling.
1
For an interpretation of balance-of-payments terminology,
see John Pippinger, “Balanee of Payments Deficits: Measure-
ment and interpretation” this Review (November 1973).
trends is illustrated in the accompanying chart. Dur-
ing 1973 the reversal in the rates of increase in U.S.
exports and imports became more pronounced as a
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dollar devaluation. Such additional factors include:
differences in the rates of inflation here and abroad,
international differences in business activity, strong
demand for raw materials, and special factors such
as poor harvests abroad.
On balance, from January to October 1973 the trade
balance was in surplus by $0.8 billion at an annual
rate. This compares to annual deficits of $2.7 billion
in 1971 and $6.9 billion in 1972.
During the first ten months of 1973 the recorded
value of U.S. exports increased by 42 percent, while
the recorded value of U.S. imports increased by only
24 percent.2 In fact, exports were absolutely greater
than imports in April, July, September, and October.
Although the April and July surpluses were between
$100 million and $200 million, the September surplus
was a substantial $873 million, and the October sIlr~
plus amounted to $527 million.
During 1973 the rates of increase of agricultural
commodity exports and petroleum product imports
significantly exceeded the rates of increase of total
exports and imports. Exports of agricultural products
increased at a rate of 86 percent during the first eight
months of 1973, compared to a 39 percent rate of
increase in total exports in the same period.3 For
comparison, agricultural exports increased by 22 per-
cent in 1972 and by 7 percent in 1971,
;ta~e increases are measured in relation to the same
period a year earlier, unless stated otherwise.
3
Data for agricultural exports and petro’eum imports were
available only for the first eight months of 1973. Data for
physical quantities of exports and imports were available
only for the first half of 1973.
Petroleum imports reached a rate of increase of 58
percent for the first eight months of 1973, compared
to total imports whidi grew by only 24 percent during
this period. Petroleum imports grew persistently from
a 29 percent rate of increase in 1972 and, apart from
possible embargoes, could be expected to increase as
domestic oil consumption continues to exceed domes-
tic production.
The physical quantity of our exports was 21 percent
greater during the first half of 1973 than in the second
half of 1972. From the second half of 1971 to the first
half of 1972, this rate of increase was 11 percent. The
quantity of imports, on the other hand, was 7 percent
greater during the first half of 1973 than in the second
half of 1972. From the second half of 1971 to the first
half of 1972 this rate of increase was 12 percent.
Basic Balance
The basic balance, which encompasses merchandise
trade, services, unilateral transfers, and long-term cap-
ital flows, was in deficit by $3.5 billion during the first
half of 1973.~ This compares to a deficit of $9.8 billion
for 1972. However, during the third quarter of 1973
this balance was probably in surplus by as much as
$4 billion.5 It follows, then, that the basic deficit for
the first three quarters of 1973 would be about $1 bil-
lion. This reduction is largely caused by the move-
ment of the U.S. trade balance into surplus, but also
reflects increased receipts by U.S. corporations and
individuals of investment income from abroad.°De-
spite increased foreign direct investment expendi-
tures in the United States, there were somewhat larger
outflows of net long-term capital from the United
States during the first half of 1973, as compared to
1972. Moreover, foreign purchases of U.S. securities
declined during the second quarter.
During the third quarter, however, foreign pur-
chases of U.S. securities have increased again. If such
purchases continue, and the trade balance continues
in surplus, the U.S. basic balance should approach
equilibrium or perhaps even move into surplus for the
year as a whole.
Merchandise Trade
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~A1I balance-of-payments figures are reported as seasonally
adjusted animal rates.
5
This estimate is based on preliminary U.S. Department of
Commerce data for the third quarter which indicates that
net foreign purchases of U.S. securities amounted to $4.9
billion and bank reported Tong-term capita’ inflows amounted
to $1.3 billion. 6The inereased receipts from investment income is parily
related to the dollar depreciation which has the effect of
increasing the dollar value of a given amount of foreign-
currency denominated earnings.
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Dollar Exchange Rate Net Liquidity and Official Settlements
Balances
The net liquidity balance includes, in addition to
the basic balance, private and official short-term capi-
tal flows and errors and omissions. This balance was
in deficit by $26.6 billion in the first quarter and $6.4
billion in the second quarter. For the third quarter,
however, a surplus of $4.2 billion developed, the
first surplus since the fourth quarter of 1969. This
compares to deficits of $22 billion and $13.9 billion
for 1971 and 1972, respectively.
The official settlements balance registered a deficit
of $42 billion for the first quarter, and surpluses of
$1.5 billion and $8.6 billion for the second and third
quarters, respectively.7 This balance was also in con-
tinuous deficit sh~ce the fourth quarter of 196c, reach-
ing $29.8 billion in 1971 and $10.3 billion in 1972.
The extreme deficits in these two balances in the
first quarter reflect massive short-term capital outflows
preceding the February dollar devaluation. The sec-
ond quarter reduction in the net liquidity deficit and
the surplus in the official settlements balance, as well
as the third quarter sw-pluses in both balances, were
probably related to the floating of major currencies
against the dollar. This floating had the effect of
equilibrating private supply and demand for dollars
which, therefore, eliminated both the incentives for
1arge~sca1edollar outflows from the United States and
the accrual of dollar balances on the part of foreign
central banks. Moreover, the differential between U.S.
interest rates and Eurodollar interest rates narrowed
and led to an increase in borrowing on the part of
U.S. banks from foreign banks.
These factors explain the net short-term dollar in-
flows during the second quarter amounting to $4.6
billion, and third quarter inflows which were probably
also large. This compares to net outflows of short-
term capital amounting to $38.6 billion during the
first quarter. The rising dollar exchange rate and re-
ductions of dollar holdings on the part of foreign
central banks may be an illdication that both the net
liquidity and the official settlements balances will
record surpluses in the fourth quarter of 1973.
7
The difference between these two balance-of-payments corn
cepts is the treatment of liquid private capital flows. These
flows are included in the official settlements balance but not in
the net liquidity ba1arn~e.Thus during the first quarter of
1973 the net liquidity deficit was less than the official settle-
ments balance by the amount of liquid private capital out-
flows. Because liquid private eapital inflows exceeded the
net liquidity deficit (luring the second quarter of 1973, an
official settlements surplus resulted.
After the February 12 devaluation, the dollar con-
tinued to depreciate in foreign exchange markets. By
July 6, the depreciation amounted to 21.2 percent on
a tirade-weighted basis, compared to 15~2percent im-
mediately after February 12.~However, in light of
the improved price competitiveness of U.S. products
in world markets, and the movement toward equilib-
rium in the basic international transactions of the
United States, the continuing dollar depreciation was
puzzling to both U.S. and foreign observers.
Following a meeting at the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) in early July, representatives of the
major central banks decided to implement, if deemed
appropriate, an earlier agreement regarding exchange
market intervention to “maintain orderly markets.”
Furthermore, the U.S. Treasury approved the drawing
on swap lines to finance U.S. exchange market inter-
vention, and the Federal Reserve System announced
an increase in the swap network from $11.7 billion to
$18 billion.9 Although intervention by both the U.S.
and foreign central banks remained minimal in
amount, the dollar price in terms of foreign currencies
began to stabilize.
This halting of the dollar price decline apparently
reflected official willingness to intervene in foreign
exchange markets as well as recognition that equilib-
rium in the basic international transactions of the
United States was imminent. Finally, on October 25
the international price of the dollar began to increase
sharply. This probably reflected the large September
trade surplus and the recognition that oil shortages
would affect Europe and Japan more thau the United
States. By November 27 the trade-weighted depre-
ciation of the dollar, at 15.3 percent, was virtually the
same as immediately after the February dollar
devaluation.
Suni.mary
Considerably improved price competitiveness for
U.S. products in world markets, aided by the reduc-
tion in the international price of the dollar, resulted in
8
The trade-weighted dollar depreciation is measured by
changes in the values of 11 major currencies relative to ex-
change rates prevailing in ?lay 1971, weighted by trade
shares with the United States.
°Swap lines are short-term reciprocal Ithes of credit between
the Federal Reserve System and 14 major foreign central
banks pius the Bar~kfor International Settlements. The Fed-
eral Reserve System, in effect, can borrow foreign currency
in order to purchase dollars in the foreign exchange
market.
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a small trade surplus so far this year. This trade sur-
plus dominated movements in other components of
the balance of payments and generated movement
toward equilibrium in the basic balance.
The balance of payments during 1973, as measured
by the net liquidity and the official settlements con-
cept, was in deficit as large net short-term capital
outflows occurred prior to the dollar devaluation of
February 12.
There are two factors which augur for substantially
smaller deficits in the net liquidity balance and per-
haps surpluses in the official settlements balance in
the future: 1) the currency realignment of February
1973 reduced the international price of the dollar sub-
stantially; 2) eventual equilibrium in the basic bal-
ance of payments and the absence of expectations of
further capital gains in other currencies should pro-
mote confidence in the dollar as an international asset.
Both factors should remove the incenlives for dollar
outflows from the United States and may be condu-
cive for further reflows of dollars to the United States,
However, these developments may be affected by in-
creased costs of U.S. imports of oil.
Prospects for 1974 suggest a slowdown in economic
activity in the United States. But, the very restrictive
monetary policies of major foreign countries in recent
months will also lead to economic slowdowns abroad.
This may have the effect of reducing U.S. import de-
mand as well as foreign demand for our exports.
However, due to the increased price competitiveness
of U.S. goods in world markets, a complete reversal of
recently established export and import trends is not
likely to materialize.
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